
Summary
An anomaly-based detection rule named 'Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage' for endpoint telemetry that flags ngrok executions on Linux and Windows by process name or original file name, including renamed binaries, and correlates ngrok CLI behaviors indicative of tunneling and proxy activity. The rule detects authentication setup with TCP tunneling to sensitive ports (3389/445), all-tunnel startup patterns, and usage of the Invoke-Ngrok wrapper. It ingests process data from sources such as CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2, Sysmon EventID 1, Sysmon for Linux EventID 1, and Windows Event Log Security 4688, normalizes fields to the CIM, and computes a set of flags (e.g., has_ngrok_process_name, has_auth_setup, has_tcp_tunnel, has_sensitive_port, has_start_all, has_config, has_region, has_tunnel_command, has_endpoint_option, has_invoke_ngrok, has_fileserver). A final where clause triggers on combinations including direct ngrok process/file presence, authentication + TCP tunnel + port, config + region + tunnel command, region + tunnel + endpoint option, Invoke-Ngrok + fileserver, or fileserver + auth_setup. The rule surfaces intermediate findings with user and destination context for analyst review, and references MITRE techniques such as T1572 (Protocol Tunneling), T1090 (Proxy), and T1102. It also aligns with threat intelligence like CISA AA22-320A and AA24-241A. Analysts should review the collected commands, the parent process, user, endpoint, and configured tunnel configuration to determine authorization. The rule acknowledges legitimate ngrok use and advises tuning allowlists for approved users, hosts, and workflows.
Categories
- Endpoint
Data Sources
- Process
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1572
- T1090
- T1102
Created: 2026-11-16