This rule is designed to detect potential sideloading of the "wwlib.dll" file, which is pertinent in scenarios where attackers attempt to leverage DLL sideloading as a method for executing malicious payloads. The rule triggers under specific conditions, notably when the image loaded ends with "\wwlib.dll" and also complies with the defined filters related to the legitimate installation paths for Microsoft Office programs, particularly winword.exe. The detection condition requires that while a specific DLL is being loaded, it does not originate from the expected paths (C:\Program Files\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\) that would normally be associated with legitimate Office operation. This approach aims to identify potentially malicious sideloading attempts that could indicate a breach or exploit activity, particularly in the context of the ongoing threat landscape where techniques like DLL sideloading are frequently exploited. By focusing on these specific paths, this rule effectively minimizes the chances of false positives, although some noise from unknown activities may still occur. The rule is positioned at a medium severity level, balancing the possible risk of exposure against the likelihood of legitimate use cases in enterprise environments.