The rule detects renamed Powershell executions, which are common tactics used by attackers to avoid detection and circumvent security measures that rely on process names and paths. Such renamed instances of Powershell can indicate malicious activity as attackers may modify the name of the Powershell executable to avoid triggering security systems. The detection logic focuses on the standard execution channels of Powershell while filtering out legitimate instances of its execution by checking known paths and host applications. The desired log source for this detection is Windows powershell classic start events, harnessing event logs for analysis. If a Powershell execution is present that shouldn’t exist based on the filtering conditions set, an alert will be triggered, providing security operations teams with the visibility needed to investigate potential misuse of Powershell. It's advisable to monitor this for low-priority incidents, as false positives may occur due to benign applications running Powershell with altered names.