The detection rule identifies potentially malicious activities by monitoring Windows systems for suspicious PowerShell usage involving the loading of the Task Scheduler COM DLL, which is followed closely by an outbound RPC connection. This type of behavior may indicate an attacker attempting lateral movement or remote discovery through the use of scheduled tasks. The rule utilizes a sequence-based query in Event Query Language (EQL) to track processes on Windows hosts that load the 'taskschd.dll' and subsequently establish RPC connections. Alerts generated by this detection can signal potentially unauthorized executions of scheduled tasks and should be analyzed to discern legitimate administrative activities from potential threats. The rule accounts for potential false positives resulting from legitimate administrative tasks or scheduled installations, advising investigations to focus on unexpected behavior and unusual outbound network communications, especially those targeting port 135, which is commonly used for RPC services. It emphasizes the importance of correlation with other logs and security events to confirm any possible compromise and suggests remedial actions to mitigate suspected breaches, such as isolating affected systems, terminating suspicious processes, and thorough forensic evaluations to identify and eliminate any malicious scripts or tasks created by an attacker.