
Summary
This rule detects HTTP requests that carry malformed Base64 content or trigger a scripted Base64 decoder in the JVM, and correlates them with nearby Java HotSpot exceptions on the same host and Java PID. It monitors Zeek HTTP data (headers, POST body, and URI) for Base64 anomalies and links them to Java hotspot exception messages (e.g., IllegalArgumentException, Input byte array has wrong, Base64$Decoder, java.util.Base64). Optional Sysmon for Linux events (Process creation, File creation, Process termination) provide additional context when available. The detection parses and ties events using JVM-related fields (jvm_pid, jvm_message, jvm_tags) and creates a request marker that ties together the Zeek-derived network event with the corresponding JVM event within a defined time window (roughly 3 seconds before to 15 seconds after the request, with Sysmon context up to 30 seconds after). When a network request with a malformed or scripted Base64 indicator coincides with a JVM exception signal, the rule flags a true positive and surfaces enriched data such as source/destination, URI, HTTP method, and marker. The rule also notes potential false positives due to independent Java processes, clock skew, or PID reuse, and emphasizes that evidence from HotSpot logs may be high-volume and not guaranteed in every environment. The analytic story connects to Java4Shell indicators and is intended for endpoint detection where Zeek and JVM/Sysmon data are available.
Categories
- Endpoint
Data Sources
- Network Traffic
- Web Credential
- Process
- File
- Application Log
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1190
Created: 2026-11-19