This detection rule targets remote file copy attempts to hidden network shares in Windows environments, which may indicate potential lateral movement or data staging activities by threat actors. The rule utilizes the Elastic Query Language (EQL) to monitor process events originating from various data sources, including logs from endpoint events, Windows Defender, Sysmon, and third-party security tools like SentinelOne and Crowdstrike. By looking for specific processes (cmd.exe, PowerShell, xcopy.exe, robocopy.exe) and analyzing their command-line arguments for suspicious patterns (i.e., operations using hidden shares identified by \*\*$), the rule aims to identify potentially malicious behavior. This is particularly significant since hidden shares can be exploited by adversaries to facilitate unauthorized data transfers beneath the visibility threshold of standard monitoring practices. Upon detection, it is crucial for incident response teams to conduct a thorough analysis of the executing process, correlate it with user activity, and respond effectively to mitigate any further risks associated with the incident.