
Summary
Detections identify the first-time creation of an Amazon EBS snapshot by an identity within a defined lookback window, leveraging the AWS EC2 CreateSnapshot/CreateSnapshots API. The rule uses New Terms to flag when a novel combination of cloud.account.id, user.name, and source.as.organization.name appears in a successful CreateSnapshot/CreateSnapshots event (as observed in AWS CloudTrail data streams). The history window is 7 days and the evaluation window is approximately now minus 6 minutes. This means the rule raises only on first-seen principal/origin combinations for this action within the lookback period, reducing noise from routine operations. The underlying data source is AWS CloudTrail events from ec2.amazonaws.com, focusing on snapshot-related actions. The intent is to detect potential abuse where an attacker may snapshot volumes, then share or copy the snapshot to an attacker-controlled account for data exfiltration or data collection in a compromised environment. The MITRE mapping is T1578.001 (Create Snapshot) under Defense Evasion (TA0005). Exclusions are applied to reduce false positives by ignoring high-risk but legitimate backups or admin activity (e.g., known providers or backup services as noted in the rule’s not-noted organization names and invoked_by exclusions). Investigation guidance covers principal verification, source organization, egress context, and correlation with follow-on snapshot-sharing or copy operations. False positives include routine backups or ad hoc snapshots performed by administrators. Remediation emphasizes reviewing snapshot sharing/copying, revoking cross-account permissions, and tightening least privilege on EC2 snapshot APIs.
Categories
- Cloud
- AWS
Data Sources
- Snapshot
- Cloud Service
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1578.001
- T1578
Created: 2026-11-11