This detection rule is designed to identify suspicious access to the SystemConfiguration preferences plist file on macOS systems, which may suggest reconnaissance efforts by malicious actors attempting to gather sensitive network configuration details for further exploits. The rule leverages EQL (Event Query Language) to analyze endpoint file events, specifically looking for instances where the specified plist is accessed by processes that are typically associated with scripting or temporary execution. Such processes can include languages like Python, osascript, Perl, Ruby, and Node.js, especially when they originate from non-standard directories such as /Users/Shared or /tmp. The significance of detecting these accesses lies in the potential for attackers to precursors to lateral movement or data exfiltration, thus flagging them as significant threats. A thorough investigation process is outlined, detailing methods for tracing the lineage of the accessing process, assessing its legitimacy through provenance checks, and correlating with other activity that may indicate a broader reconnaissance strategy. The rule also highlights common false positives from legitimate administrative activities, thereby framing a nuanced approach to threat detection and response.