
Summary
Analyzes Windows process command lines for obfuscated arguments that replace ASCII letters with superscript or modifier Unicode characters. The rule targets instances where system binaries (e.g., msiexec.exe) are invoked with arguments that visually resemble legitimate switches but use Unicode look-alikes to bypass simplistic string-based detections. This technique has been observed in campaigns (e.g., ClickFix-style) where an attacker pastes a command into Run dialog to silently install a remote MSI via msiexec. The detection relies on endpoint telemetry (process creation data) from EDR tools (Sysmon EventID 1, Windows Security 4688, CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2), normalizes data to the Endpoint data model, and applies a regex that matches command-line tokens containing Unicode superscripts and related modifier ranges to identify suspicious obfuscated patterns. When triggered, the rule surfaces the endpoint, user, process, and parent-process context to aid investigation, tagged with MITRE techniques related to obfuscated commands and proxy execution. The approach complements traditional string-matching by focusing on Unicode-based obfuscation that commonly slips past basic detectors, providing a more robust signal in environments with diverse EDR feeds and CIM-aligned data models.
Categories
- Endpoint
Data Sources
- Process
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1027
- T1218
- T1027.010
Created: 2026-11-16