
Summary
This detector flags a process that originates from a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData, or C:\PerfLogs) and is spawned by cmd.exe when acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher. Attackers leverage native messaging to register a malicious host so a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries (for example, a bundled Python interpreter) on demand, enabling a stealthy command-and-control and persistence channel under the logged-in user’s context. The rule narrows results by requiring the parent process to be cmd.exe with a parent path containing a chrome-extension URL or a chrome.nativeMessaging pipe, and the child process path to reside in a user-writable location. It excludes known legitimate hosts; if identified as malicious, the extension and native host should be validated and added to an exclusion list. The detection is built on data from EDR telemetry (Sysmon EventID 1, Windows Security Event 4688, and CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2) and maps to the Endpoint data model (Processes) for normalization. Outputs include key process relationships (spawned process and its parent) and time bounds, with references to a Browser Hijacking analytic context. MITRE mappings cited by the rule include T1176.001 (Native Messaging) and T1059.003 (Command-Line Interface). Drilldown searches help investigators review per-user/destination results and recent risk events related to the involved entities. Overall, this is a potential browser-based persistence/C2 vector requiring validation of hosts and extensions.
Categories
- Endpoint
- Windows
Data Sources
- Process
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1176
- T1059
- T1176.001
- T1059.003
Created: 2026-11-16