This rule aims to detect a sophisticated two-stage command and control (C2) pattern utilizing Google Calendar as a tactical mechanism for communication between malware and threat actors. The first phase involves a script interpreter (e.g., Node.js, Python, osascript) connecting to `calendar.app.google` to retrieve a hidden C2 address, after which it establishes a second connection to the decoded host. This tactic leverages Unicode steganography embedded within Google Calendar event descriptions to conceal the dynamic nature of C2 endpoints, integrating seamlessly within normal user traffic to evade traditional security measures. This detection strategy specifically identifies potential live-off-the-land techniques, where adversaries exploit existing cloud infrastructure for malicious activity without raising immediate alarms. Potential signs of compromise include unexpected script interpreter activity linked to Google Calendar API connections, and analysis of associated events and user activities is vital for confirming malicious intents and mitigating risks.