
Summary
This rule detects the first occurrence within a lookback window where an identity reads the AWS account password policy via the IAM GetAccountPasswordPolicy API. Adversaries who have gained credentials often enumerate password policy requirements to tailor password spraying, brute force, or to assess persistence options. The rule uses a New Terms condition to flag a rare combination of cloud.account.id, user.name, and source.as.organization.name for this action that has not appeared in the configured history window (now-7d). It relies on AWS CloudTrail data (event.provider iam.amazonaws.com, event.action GetAccountPasswordPolicy, event.outcome: success) and is triggered when the three fields (cloud.account.id, user.name, source.as.organization.name) occur together in a way that’s novel for the principal and network origin. The detection is mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Discovery technique T1201. The rule also defines investigation fields to help analysts triage, and suggests correlating with related IAM activity (GetCallerIdentity, AssumeRole, CreateAccessKey, ConsoleLogin) to determine whether the read is legitimate or malicious. False positives may arise from routine IAM/security admin tasks or CSPM tooling. Recommended responses include credential rotation for implicated principals, reviewing CloudTrail for follow-on activity, and tightening least-privilege access to IAM read APIs where appropriate.
Categories
- Cloud
- Identity Management
Data Sources
- Cloud Service
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1201
Created: 2026-11-11