The detection rule targets the abuse of Windows Credential Manager via the command-line tool VaultCmd, which can be exploited by adversaries to list or extract stored credentials. The rule is implemented using EQL (Event Query Language) and checks for processes associated with VaultCmd that run with the argument '/list*', indicating an attempt to access saved usernames and passwords. This behavior is pertinent for lateral movement strategies, as adversaries may aim to harvest credentials to facilitate unauthorized access across the network. By monitoring specific process executions that match this criteria, security teams can detect potential credential access incidents early, allowing for timely investigation and response. The rule utilizes various data sources including Winlogbeat logs, Sysmon operational logs, and logs from security solutions such as Crowdstrike and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, ensuring comprehensive coverage of potential attacks. Recommendations for investigation and response are provided, including validating the legitimacy of VaultCmd usage, assessing user behavior, and implementing safeguards to minimize false positives resulting from normal administrative activities.