
Summary
Identifies Entra ID administrative password resets where the initiating principal differs from the target user. The rule detects cases where an actor (administrator or service/app) resets another user’s password, which can indicate account takeover or persistence activity such as business email compromise. It normalizes the initiator across user- and app-initiated operations and compares the initiator against the target to surface cross-user password-reset events. The ES|QL query operates on Azure Entra (Azure AD) audit logs, filtering for successful password-reset actions (Reset user password, Update PasswordProfile) and excluding resets triggered by the Microsoft password reset service. It computes Esql.actor from either the user principal name or the app display name and Esql.target from the target user principal name. The alert fires when both actor and target are known and distinct, and retains relevant fields for investigation (timestamps, source, and Azure metadata). The rule is mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1098 (Account Manipulation) under Persistence, guiding investigators toward potential misuse or continued access. The design supports correlation with subsequent sign-ins, MFA changes, mailbox rules, and app-consent activity to determine whether the reset was expected or anomalous. This rule is intended to reduce noise from routine helpdesk actions by requiring a cross-actor relationship and by normalizing initiator identities across different operation modes. For triage, reviewers should verify ticket context, confirm whether the reset was authorized, and look for unusual network origins or prior suspicious activity on the target account. For response, consider re-securing the target account (reset password, revoke sessions), and rotating the initiator’s credentials if unauthorized.
Categories
- Cloud
- Identity Management
- Azure
Data Sources
- Cloud Service
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1098.003
- T1098
Created: 2026-11-12