The detection rule titled 'KRBTGT Delegation Backdoor' identifies modifications to the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute associated with the KRBTGT account in Active Directory. This type of manipulation can allow attackers to obtain Kerberos tickets and maintain persistence within a domain by effectively hijacking the KRBTGT service. In this context, security analysts must monitor for specific Windows Event IDs, particularly event code '4738', which indicates changes to user account properties, along with checking the modification history of the KRBTGT account. Proper setup requires the 'Audit User Account Management' policy to be enabled to capture both success and failure logs. The rule utilizes EQL (Event Query Language) to generate alerts whenever changes to the KRBTGT delegation settings are detected. Investigative steps involve reviewing logs for unauthorized modifications, assessing user account activities, and collaborating with security teams to ascertain the legitimacy of these changes. Remediation actions may include alerting the Incident Response Team (IRT), resetting affected attributes, and implementing tighter controls around critical account management.