
Summary
This rule detects registration of a FIDO2 security key or passkey for a Microsoft Entra ID user via a path other than the self-service registration portal (Microsoft App Access Panel). While admin provisioning via Graph, service principals, or other applications can be legitimate, such registrations can also indicate scripted provisioning or the creation of a shadow passkey after account takeover, enabling phishing-resistant persistence. The rule requires Entra ID audit logs and flags registrations initiated by apps or service principals different from the target user, or those following anomalous sign-ins or OAuth consent events. The detection guides analysts to verify the initiating application, compare initiator vs target user principals, review modifiedProperties for FIDO2 details (AaGuid, AttestationLevel, PasskeyType), and correlate with sign-in/OAuth events prior to the registration. It also notes risk if the target holds privileged roles. False positives can occur from legitimate bulk onboarding or helpdesk provisioning; baselining approved provisioning apps and administrators is recommended. Response steps include removing attacker-registered keys/devices, revoking the offending application consent, and enforcing phishing-resistant authentication, along with tightening write-access for authentication methods.
Categories
- Azure
- Identity Management
- Cloud
Data Sources
- Cloud Service
ATT&CK Techniques
- T1098
- T1098.001
Created: 2026-10-21