Detects the execution of Defendnot, a hacktool that abuses the Windows Security Center API to disable Windows Defender by masquerading as a fake antivirus product. The rule triggers on Windows process creation events when: the image name contains defendnot; the command line contains defendnot and/or the URL https://dnot.sh/; and the IMPRHASH (IMPHASH) of the binary matches a known set of Defendnot variants. By requiring a combination of image name, command-line indicators, and known hash values, the rule aims to detect known Defendnot executions while reducing false positives. It is marked as high severity with unlikely false positives and targets defense-impairment activity on Windows endpoints. Operators may supplement with additional indicators such as signed path anomalies or related Defender/Windows Security Center API usage to strengthen detection against potential rename or hash-evasion attempts.