heroui logo

Entra ID Potential Passkey Downgrade

Elastic Detection Rules

View Source
Summary
This ES|QL rule analyzes Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Sign-In Logs to flag users whose recent authentication activity is predominantly phishing-resistant (passkey/FIDO2 or Windows Hello for Business) but who subsequently succeed with a phishable method (Authenticator push, OATH, SMS, or voice). The detection guards against adversary-in-the-middle downgrades by suppressing the passkey prompt, forcing a weaker method that the proxy can capture. It computes a phishing-resistant ratio using a baseline of sessions older than 24 hours (requiring at least three resistant sessions) so the recent downgrade does not dilute the historical resistant pattern. Only sessions with a successful fresh method are counted (excludes token reuse or out-of-window events). A downgrade is flagged when a phishable method succeeds in the recent window. The rule aggregates data per tenant and user, requiring a minimum baseline of resistant sessions and at least one downgrade in the window, plus a resistant_ratio threshold (≥ 0.9) to ensure the user remains predominantly phishing-resistant. The alert surfaces detailed context for investigation, including downgrade sessions, methods, IPs, geo, AS, user agents, device OS, CA status, and related metadata, to support correlation with compliance and recovery events. Threat context: Maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1556 Modify Authentication Process (T1556.006 MFA), T1078 Cloud Accounts, and T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material (Web Session Cookie). Prerequisites include enabling Azure Entra ID Sign-In Logs collection via Azure Event Hub. False positives can occur when legitimate fallback happens due to temporary unavailability of a passkey; correlate with device, network, and recovery activity to validate the downgrade as malicious. Recommended response if confirmed: revoke sessions, refresh tokens, remove attacker-registered authentication methods or devices, reset credentials, and enforce phishing-resistant authentication strength via Conditional Access policies. Notes for operators include triage guidance, evidence sources, and mitigations aligned with Entra ID logs and policy controls. References cover MFA downgrade and related phishing-resistance topics.
Categories
  • Cloud
  • Identity Management
  • Azure
Data Sources
  • Cloud Service
ATT&CK Techniques
  • T1557
  • T1556
  • T1556.006
  • T1078
  • T1078.004
  • T1550
  • T1550.004
Created: 2026-10-21