The "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush" detection rule identifies the usage of a suspicious rundll32 command line intended to clear the Windows shim cache. This behavior is noted for its classification as an anti-forensic technique that adversaries may employ to avoid detection and erase forensic artifacts following malicious activities. Leveraging telemetry from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions, the detection examines logs related to process executions, specifically monitoring for execution patterns that include the command to flush the shim cache using apphelp.dll. If deemed malicious, such actions could significantly obstruct incident responses by allowing perpetrators to eliminate traces of their activities on compromised systems. The detection rule is meticulously designed to utilize data from Sysmon EventID 1, Windows Event Logs for process creations (Event ID 4688), and analyses from CrowdStrike's ProcessRollup2 event data, ensuring a comprehensive approach to monitor lethargic behavior associated with task automation and malware evasion tactics.