This rule detects OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise user messages that combine two or more jailbreak techniques in a single message. It ingests conversation_message logs from the OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise integration and computes four indicator booleans by applying regular expressions to the user message: instruction override (override or forget prior instructions), persona switch (demand to act as an unrestricted or different persona), restriction removal (bypass safety filters or policies), and system prompt extraction (request to reveal the system prompt). If two or more indicators are true in the same message, the rule raises an alert that includes the message, user and conversation context, and the individual indicator flags. The detection is mapped to MITRE ATT&CK (T1562 Impair Defenses/Defense Evasion) and MITRE ATLAS (AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection and AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak), with supporting context for related Execution/Defense Evasion tactics. The rule requires the OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise integration to ship compliance logs into Elasticsearch. Investigation guidance emphasizes reviewing the message content and the broader conversation, correlating with user identity, checking for legitimate research roles, and assessing whether workspace policies or GPT Instructions need tightening. False positives include AI safety researchers and long design/docs that describe multiple jailbreak techniques together. Remediation steps include enforcing acceptable use, tightening workspace policies, and determining whether content should be reported or removed. The rule uses a multi-indicator threshold (>=2) to reduce single-phrase false positives and provides an investigation field set and risk framing (risk_score 47, severity medium).